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Zurich Information Security Center
We are affiliated with the Zurich Information Security Center (ZISC)
The ZISC workshop on Securing Future Communication Networks against Emerging Threats will take place on 16-17 October 2013 at ETH Zurich and is announced here.
Events & News
ProtoVeriPhy is an Isabelle/HOL framework for analyzing
physical protocols such as distance bounding protocols, secure
time-synchronization protocols, and authenticated ranging protocols.
There are two versions of the framework. The original version and an extended version that accounts for overshadowing attacks.
The original version is described in the articles "Formal Reasoning about Physical Properties of Security Protocols" (TISSEC'11) and "Let's get physical: Models and Methods for Real-World Security Protocols" (TPHOLS'09). It includes support for reasoning about XOR and authenticated ranging, distance bounding, broadcast authentication, and secure time synchronization protocols as case studies:
An extended version that accounts for overshadowing attacks is described in "Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols" (Security&Privacy'12). This version includes proofs that the Brands-Chaum protocol and a wrongly fixed version are vulnerable to Distance-Hijacking attacks. Additionally, it contains proofs that our proposed fixes indeed prevent these attacks.
Benedikt Schmidt, Patrick Schaller
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